Taken together, these recommendations paint a picture of an industry that understands its problems clearly and has thought carefully about the solutions. What remains to be seen is whether regulators and policymakers will respond with the urgency the situation demands. Broker companies are not abstract entities — they are the infrastructure through which ordinary Nepali investors participate in the capital market. When that infrastructure is failing, the damage extends well beyond the companies themselves.

There is a quiet crisis unfolding inside Nepal's capital market — one that does not make headlines but strikes at the very foundation of how the stock exchange functions. Broker companies, the essential intermediaries that connect investors to the market, are struggling to keep their doors open. For some, the situation has gone beyond difficult and entered the territory of the genuinely unsustainable.
The numbers released by Nepal Stock Exchange tell a story that should alarm anyone who cares about the health of the capital market. In the month of Jestha, 91 broker companies collectively earned Rs. 36.62 million in trading commissions. That sounds reasonable until you look beneath the surface. Three of those companies earned less than Rs. 50,000 for the entire month. Pahi Investment took in Rs. 49,122. Beni Securities earned Rs. 39,307. And Money World Share Exchange — an actual licensed brokerage firm operating in Nepal's stock market — earned Rs. 515 in commission for the whole month. That is less than the cost of a modest meal at a Kathmandu restaurant, earned over thirty days of operation.
To understand why this matters, consider what it costs to run even the most modest broker company. According to Bhaktiram Ghimire, Secretary General of the Stock Brokers' Association of Nepal, monthly operating expenses for a broker firm run to approximately Rs. 1.5 million. Staff salaries, office rent, TMS charges, compliance costs, internet connectivity, and administrative expenses all add up quickly. When a company earns Rs. 515 in revenue against Rs. 1.5 million in costs, it is not running a business — it is burning through whatever reserves it has left.
This is not a problem that appeared overnight. In the previous fiscal year, five out of 92 broker companies recorded net losses — and that was a year when trading volumes were actually higher than they are now. Pahi Investment lost Rs. 6.514 million. Beni Securities bled Rs. 8.050 million. Money World Share Exchange posted a net loss of Rs. 10.001 million. The trajectory was already heading in the wrong direction before conditions deteriorated further.
The root cause is not difficult to identify. Daily average trading turnover on NEPSE, which stood at Rs. 15 billion to Rs. 16 billion last year, has collapsed to Rs. 2 billion to Rs. 3 billion — a decline of roughly 80 percent. Every broker company's commission income is directly tied to this figure. When the market shrinks that dramatically, the entire broker ecosystem shrinks with it. Companies that were barely profitable at higher volumes are now deeply loss-making, and those that were already struggling have been pushed to the brink.
Ghimire does not mince words about what needs to change. When new broker companies entered the market, the expectation was that fresh competition would bring new products, new services, and new revenue streams beyond simple buy-sell commissions. That expectation has not been met. The business model has remained almost entirely dependent on trading commissions, and when those commissions dry up, there is nothing else to fall back on. "How can institutions sustain themselves purely on buy-sell transactions in this environment?" he asked. The question answers itself.
Margin trading was supposed to be part of the answer. It has been discussed extensively, regulations have been approved, and a handful of companies have received authorization. But in practice, only one broker — NASA Securities — has actually launched margin trading services. The others remain stuck in a regulatory and operational limbo, with some having to pledge their own assets as collateral with banks just to fund the margin facilities they are supposed to be offering clients. This is the opposite of how margin trading is supposed to work, and it reflects a broader failure of implementation that has left a potentially transformative product sitting largely unused.
The investor side of the equation is equally grim. Since the current government took office, total market capitalization has shrunk by more than Rs. 400 billion. Investors who entered the market expecting gains have instead watched their portfolios erode. Sentiment has turned cautious, participation has fallen, and the mood across the market is one of quiet waiting rather than active engagement. In this environment, asking broker companies to generate meaningful commission income is like asking a restaurant to profit when almost no customers are walking through the door.
The Stock Brokers' Association has responded to the crisis by submitting a detailed set of policy recommendations to Nepal Rastra Bank ahead of the upcoming monetary policy announcement. The proposals are practical and targeted. The association wants the six-month holding restriction for banks and financial institutions investing in the secondary market to be removed, allowing easier entry and exit and potentially injecting significant institutional liquidity into a market that desperately needs it. It has called for margin trading loans to be classified as a separate financial product under commercial lending, and for share-collateral loans to be measured against total loan investment rather than core capital — a change that would meaningfully expand the capacity of broker companies to offer margin facilities.
On the international front, the association has pushed for smoother pathways for Non-Resident Nepalis and foreign institutional investors to invest in the secondary market and repatriate returns. It has also proposed listing government savings bonds and treasury bills on NEPSE for secondary market trading — a move that would broaden the investment universe and bring a class of traditionally cautious investors into the market for the first time.
One recommendation stands out for its practical urgency. When broker companies' settlement accounts are frozen during investigations — accounts that hold client funds rather than company funds — normal trading operations grind to a halt. Innocent clients cannot transact while their broker is under scrutiny for unrelated matters. The association has asked for the account-freezing regulations to be amended so that settlement accounts are treated separately and protected from blanket freezing orders.
Taken together, these recommendations paint a picture of an industry that understands its problems clearly and has thought carefully about the solutions. What remains to be seen is whether regulators and policymakers will respond with the urgency the situation demands. Broker companies are not abstract entities — they are the infrastructure through which ordinary Nepali investors participate in the capital market. When that infrastructure is failing, the damage extends well beyond the companies themselves.
Written by
Dipesh Ghimire
