A budget that addresses only one or two of these dimensions while ignoring the others will produce headlines but not healing. What Nepal's financial sector needs this year is not a list of schemes — it needs a coherent, credible, funded strategy for rebuilding the conditions under which money moves, trust holds and the economy grows from within rather than being sustained from abroad.

KATHMANDU — Walk into any commercial bank in Kathmandu today and you will find something that should, in theory, signal economic health — vaults comfortable with liquidity, deposit counters busy, interest rate boards updated with numbers that look manageable. But step outside that bank and talk to a factory owner in Hetauda, a contractor waiting months for a government payment in Birgunj, or a microfinance borrower in Rupandehi trying to hold off a loan collector, and you encounter a completely different Nepal. The contradiction at the heart of the country's financial system — money sitting idle in banks while the real economy gasps for circulation — has become the defining economic puzzle of this budget season. How a government chooses to respond to that puzzle in the coming fiscal year will determine whether Nepal's financial sector finds its footing or slides deeper into structural fragility.
The numbers that describe Nepal's banking sector today are not the numbers of a system in collapse. They are, more troublingly, the numbers of a system that has stopped transmitting. Banks have adequate funds. The Nepal Rastra Bank's monetary interventions have brought liquidity to comfortable levels. Deposit growth has been steady, partly because remittance continues to flow in and partly because ordinary households have nowhere better to put their savings. And yet credit expansion — the process by which deposits become investments, factories, farms and jobs — has stalled in a way that is beginning to look less like a temporary dip and more like a structural freeze. Industrialists are not borrowing. Traders are not expanding. Entrepreneurs are watching and waiting. The private sector has effectively put a pause on ambition, and no reduction in the lending rate has been enough to unfreeze it.
The reason for this reluctance is not irrational. Demand across key sectors has weakened visibly. The construction industry, which was once a reliable engine of credit absorption, has slowed sharply. Real estate transactions — another traditional driver of bank lending — have dried up in many markets. Consumer spending is subdued. The import cycle, which used to pull goods and credit simultaneously, has contracted. Businesspeople who took loans during the optimistic years of the post-pandemic bounce are now sitting on inventory they cannot move and repayment schedules they can barely meet. In such an environment, taking on new debt is not a sign of enterprise but of recklessness. The private sector's "wait and see" posture is, in fact, a rational response to a demand environment that the government itself has failed to stimulate.
This is precisely why the upcoming budget carries an unusual weight. Budgets in Nepal have historically been treated as annual rituals — exercises in revenue projection, departmental allocation and political signaling through populist schemes. But the financial sector's current condition demands something different from the government this year. It demands a budget that functions less as an accounting document and more as a credible economic recovery plan. Specifically, the productive sectors — agriculture, energy, tourism, information technology and export-oriented manufacturing — need targeted concessional credit programs, interest subsidies and tax relief structures that are not merely announced but actually implemented and monitored. Unless the government can demonstrate that borrowing for production is genuinely worthwhile and protected, liquidity will continue to pile up in bank accounts while the economy waits.
Non-performing loans represent the financial sector's most immediate internal threat. Across commercial banks, development banks and finance companies, the share of loans that are not being repaid on time has been climbing. The sectors most visibly affected are construction, real estate, commercial imports and small industry. Borrowers in these areas took on debt when times looked better, priced their risk against a growth trajectory that never materialized, and are now caught between declining revenues and fixed repayment obligations. For the banks, rising NPLs translate into provisioning requirements that eat into profitability. For the wider financial system, an NPL problem that grows beyond manageable thresholds can eventually compromise capital adequacy and trigger tighter credit conditions — making the very problem it reflects even harder to escape.
The solution is not to let distressed businesses simply fail and let their collateral be auctioned. That approach recovers some loan value while destroying enterprises, employment and economic activity that took years to build. What the budget needs to facilitate instead is a structured framework for temporary loan restructuring, a formal business revival fund for viable enterprises facing short-term cash flow stress, and an Asset Management Company capable of absorbing and professionally resolving bad debt portfolios. Critically, the government must also address the chronic delay in releasing payments to contractors and construction firms that have completed public works. Many NPLs in the construction sector exist precisely because the government owes money to borrowers who owe money to banks. Settling those dues would, almost immediately, improve the loan quality of a significant portion of the banking sector's stressed portfolio.
Depositors have received less attention in this debate than they deserve. As banks have reduced deposit interest rates to manage their cost of funds in a low-credit-demand environment, the returns available to savers have fallen noticeably. For a retired government employee living off a fixed deposit, or an elderly household relying on bank interest as a primary income source, this is not an abstraction — it is a direct and monthly reduction in living standards. More broadly, falling deposit returns create incentive distortions. Savers who feel that formal banking no longer rewards them adequately may be tempted toward informal investment channels, gold, real estate speculation or cooperative deposits — all of which carry higher risk and, as recent events have shown, can end badly. The budget should introduce tax incentives for long-term savings instruments, improve the attractiveness of pension and social security fund contributions, and create a policy environment where keeping money in the formal financial system feels both safe and worthwhile.
Nepal's microfinance sector, which was once celebrated as a model for financial inclusion in a country where commercial banks could not or would not reach, is now facing a crisis of legitimacy that threatens to undo much of what it built. The problems are layered and interrelated. Aggressive lending targets pushed loan officers to disburse credit in villages without adequate assessment of repayment capacity. Multiple borrowing — where the same household takes loans from two, three or even more microfinance institutions simultaneously — became widespread and went largely unchecked for years. Recovery pressure from field staff created fear and resentment in communities where microfinance was supposed to build trust. In some rural districts, the mention of a microfinance company now triggers alarm rather than relief.
Addressing the microfinance crisis requires more than regulatory tightening, though that is necessary too. It requires a fundamental rethinking of what microfinance is supposed to accomplish. If it remains primarily a lending mechanism — a way of pushing credit to people with low incomes and limited collateral — it will continue to generate cycles of debt without generating sustainable livelihoods. What the sector needs, and what the budget should incentivize, is a shift toward a model that links microfinance to production. Credit should follow business activity — a vegetable cooperative, a handicraft cluster, a poultry unit, a rural tailoring enterprise — rather than being disbursed as general-purpose household loans with no productive anchor. Alongside this, a nationally integrated digital system to prevent multiple borrowing, an expanded financial literacy program and genuine protection for microfinance field staff, who face their own forms of pressure and insecurity, must all be part of the policy response.
The cooperative crisis, which erupted publicly when hundreds of thousands of depositors found themselves unable to retrieve their savings, has inflicted damage on Nepal's financial sector that goes beyond the cooperatives themselves. It has shaken public confidence in the idea that money entrusted to a financial institution is safe. That confidence is not a soft, sentimental thing — it is the foundation on which the entire financial system rests. When it erodes, people hoard cash, avoid formal savings channels and retreat into economic informality. The cooperative collapse was the product of weak regulation, opaque investment decisions, political protection for institution managers who should have faced accountability, and a legal framework that did not treat cooperative financial institutions with the seriousness their scale demanded. The budget must address all of these dimensions — not just through rhetorical commitments to reform, but through funded programs for managing distressed cooperatives, compensating affected depositors through a credible protection mechanism, and establishing digital real-time monitoring systems that make future crises detectable before they become catastrophic.
Digital banking is the one area where Nepal's financial sector can point to genuine and visible progress. Mobile banking users have multiplied. QR code payments have moved from urban novelty to everyday rural transaction. Digital wallets have penetrated markets that never had a bank branch. This expansion is real and valuable. But it has outpaced the security infrastructure meant to protect it. Incidents of digital fraud, unauthorized account access and online financial crime have increased alongside digital transaction volumes. A financial system that moves people online and then exposes them to cyber theft destroys trust faster than it builds it. The budget must make cybersecurity infrastructure a serious investment priority, establish a dedicated digital fraud response mechanism, and extend internet connectivity and digital financial literacy to rural areas where the newest users are also the most vulnerable.
One dimension that rarely makes it into formal budget discussions but deserves acknowledgment is the human cost of working inside a financial system under stress. Bank and financial institution employees in Nepal have, over the past several years, faced intensifying performance targets, unrealistic deposit mobilization and loan recovery quotas, and a work culture that prioritizes institutional metrics over individual wellbeing. The result has been documented cases of burnout, resignation and, in some reported instances, serious psychological distress. A financial sector whose frontline workforce is exhausted and demoralized cannot deliver quality service, cannot make sound credit judgments, and cannot build the client relationships on which sustainable banking depends. The budget should acknowledge this reality — at minimum by ensuring that labor standards, social security provisions and mental health support frameworks are extended meaningfully to financial sector workers.
The picture that emerges from an honest assessment of Nepal's banking, finance and microfinance sector in the lead-up to this budget is of a system that has the resources to help the economy but has lost the conditions — confidence, demand, trust, incentive — that would allow those resources to flow productively. Liquidity is not the problem. The problem is everything that surrounds liquidity: an uncertain investment climate, rising loan stress, a cooperative sector that has damaged public trust, a microfinance sector losing its social license, depositors who feel underrewarded and a private sector that sees more risk than opportunity in expansion. A budget that addresses only one or two of these dimensions while ignoring the others will produce headlines but not healing. What Nepal's financial sector needs this year is not a list of schemes — it needs a coherent, credible, funded strategy for rebuilding the conditions under which money moves, trust holds and the economy grows from within rather than being sustained from abroad.
Written by
Dipesh Ghimire
