शेयर बजारमा जलविद्युत कम्पनी : अनुत्तरित प्रश्नहरूको भारले थिचिएको लगानीकर्ताNepal's Hydropower Stocks: A Ticking Time Bomb in the Capital Market
नेपालको शेयर बजारमा जलविद्युत क्षेत्रका कम्पनीहरूको उपस्थिति तीव्र गतिमा बढ्दै गएको छ। आर्थिक वर्ष २०६०।६१ मा एक मात्र कम्पनीबाट सुरु भएको यो यात्रा आज १०३ कम्पनीसम्म पुगेको छ — कुल सूचीकृत कम्पनीको ३५ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी। तर यो वृद्धिको पछाडि लुकेका गम्भीर सैद्धान्तिक र कानुनी प्रश्नहरू अझै अनुत्तरित छन्, र तिनको मूल्य चुकाउने जोखिममा सर्वसाधारण लगानीकर्ता छन्।
जलविद्युत कम्पनीहरू अन्य सूचीकृत कम्पनीभन्दा मौलिक रूपमा फरक छन्। यी कम्पनीहरू बिल्ड–अपरेट–ट्रान्सफर (बुट) मोडलमा सञ्चालित हुन्छन् — अर्थात् अनुमतिपत्रको अवधि सकिएपछि सम्पूर्ण आयोजना नेपाल सरकारलाई हस्तान्तरण गर्नुपर्छ। हाल अधिकांश जलविद्युत आयोजनालाई ३५ वर्ष (निर्माण ५ वर्ष र सञ्चालन ३० वर्ष) को अनुमतिपत्र दिइन्छ। यो अवधि सकिएपछि कम्पनीको मुख्य आम्दानीको स्रोत नै सरकारलाई जान्छ — तर त्यसपछि कम्पनी कसरी चल्छ, लगानीकर्ताको सम्पत्तिको के हुन्छ भन्ने विषयमा कानुनमा एक शब्द पनि छैन।
नेपाल धितोपत्र बोर्डको तथ्यांकअनुसार आर्थिक वर्ष २०६०।६१ देखि २०८३ वैशाख मसान्तसम्म जलविद्युत कम्पनीहरूलाई कुल रु. ५० अर्ब ८५ करोड ७५ लाख बराबरको साधारण सेयर निष्काशन अनुमति प्रदान गरिएको छ। आ.व. २०८२।८३ को वैशाखसम्म यस क्षेत्रको बजार पुँजीकरण रु. ८ खर्ब १३ अर्ब ९९ करोड पुगेको छ — कुल बजार पुँजीकरणको १७.४८ प्रतिशत। कुल कारोबारको ४५.२० प्रतिशत यसै क्षेत्रबाट भएको छ। यी संख्याहरूले यस क्षेत्रको बजारमा कति गहिरो पकड छ भन्ने स्पष्ट पार्छन् — र त्यसैले यस क्षेत्रमा उत्पन्न हुन सक्ने जोखिम पनि त्यत्तिकै व्यापक हुनेछ।
विज्ञहरूले उठाएको सबैभन्दा गम्भीर प्रश्न भनेको — साधारण सेयरको मूल विशेषता नै 'अविच्छिन्नता' (Perpetuity) हो। अर्थात् साधारण सेयर सैद्धान्तिक रूपमा सधैँका लागि हुन्छ। तर जलविद्युत कम्पनीको सेयर वास्तवमा ३५ वर्षको अनुमतिपत्र अवधिसम्म मात्र अर्थपूर्ण छ। विकसित देशहरूको शेयर बजारमा बुट मोडलमा सञ्चालित कम्पनीहरूले साधारण सेयर निष्काशन गर्ने र दोस्रो बजारमा त्यसको कारोबार हुने परम्परा छैन — त्यहाँ यस्ता कम्पनीका लागि विशेष प्रयोजनका उपकरणहरू (Special Purpose Vehicles) विकास गरिन्छन्। नेपालमा भने यो महत्वपूर्ण सैद्धान्तिक प्रश्नलाई बेवास्ता गर्दै कम्पनीहरूलाई साधारण सेयर निष्काशन गर्न अनुमति दिइँदै आएको छ।
उच्चस्तरीय आर्थिक सुधार सुझाव आयोग २०८१ ले यो विषयलाई गम्भीरतापूर्वक उठाएको छ। आयोगको प्रतिवेदनमा स्पष्ट उल्लेख छ — जलविद्युत उत्पादनको अनुमतिपत्र अवधि सकिएपछि सर्वसाधारण र स्थानीयलाई जारी गरिएको सेयरको के हुन्छ भन्ने विषयमा गम्भीर अन्योल छ। कतिपय कम्पनीहरूको नेटवर्थ ऋणात्मक हुँदा पनि दोस्रो बजारमा उच्च मूल्यमा सेयर कारोबार भइरहेको तथ्यले भविष्यमा लगानीकर्ताको लगानी डुब्ने जोखिम उच्च रहेको आयोगले चेतावनी दिएको छ। आयोगले थप भनेको छ — यो अवस्था तत्काल सम्बोधन नभए ऋण तथा बचत सहकारीको समस्याभन्दा पनि गम्भीर संकट निम्तिन सक्छ।
समस्याहरू यतिमा मात्र सीमित छैनन्। हकप्रद निष्काशनका लागि आवेदन गरेका कम्पनीहरूमध्ये ५२ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी जलविद्युत क्षेत्रका कम्पनी छन्। यी कम्पनीहरूले सर्वसाधारणसँग सेयर जारी गरी उठाएको रकम बैंक ऋण तिर्नका लागि प्रयोग गर्छन् — र पछि फेरि सोही उद्देश्यका लागि हकप्रद निष्काशनको अनुमति माग्छन्। एकै व्यक्ति वा समूहद्वारा प्रवर्धित धेरै कम्पनीहरू एकसाथ सूचीकृत भएका छन्, जसले प्रणालीगत जोखिम थप बढाएको छ। संस्थापकहरूले पद छाडेर सेयर बेच्ने प्रवृत्तिले कम्पनीको सुशासनमा थप प्रश्न उठाएको छ।
विशेषज्ञहरूका अनुसार यी सबै समस्याहरूको समाधानका लागि नेपाल सरकार, ऊर्जा मन्त्रालय, अर्थ मन्त्रालय, विद्युत नियमन आयोग र नेपाल धितोपत्र बोर्डले समन्वयमा काम गर्नुपर्छ। जलविद्युत कम्पनीहरूका लागि साधारण सेयरको सट्टा उपयुक्त वित्तीय उपकरण (परियोजना बन्ड वा पूर्वाधार बन्ड) विकास गर्ने, आयोजना हस्तान्तरणपछि कम्पनी सञ्चालनको स्पष्ट कानुनी ढाँचा बनाउने, र एकै उद्देश्यका लागि पुनः सार्वजनिक निष्काशनमा रोक लगाउने विषय प्राथमिकतामा राख्नुपर्ने उनीहरू बताउँछन्। यी सैद्धान्तिक प्रश्नहरूको जवाफ नखोजिए नेपालको पुँजी बजारमाथिको विश्वास नै खतरामा पर्न सक्छ — र त्यसको सबैभन्दा ठूलो मार सर्वसाधारण लगानीकर्ताले बेहोर्नुपर्नेछ।
Nepal's stock market has quietly accumulated a structural risk that regulators, policymakers, and most investors have yet to fully reckon with. Hydropower companies now account for more than 35 percent of all listed companies on the Nepal Stock Exchange — 103 companies as of Baisakh 2082, up from just one in fiscal year 2060/61. Behind this impressive growth lies a set of unanswered legal, theoretical, and regulatory questions that could one day destabilize not just a sector, but the entire capital market. And when that day comes, it is ordinary retail investors who will bear the heaviest consequences.
The fundamental problem begins with what hydropower companies actually are. Unlike conventional listed companies that own their assets outright and operate indefinitely, hydropower companies in Nepal function under the Build-Operate-Transfer, or BOT, model. Under this arrangement, a company receives a license to construct and operate a hydropower project for a fixed period — currently 35 years, comprising 5 years for construction and 30 years for operation — after which the entire project, including all infrastructure and assets, must be handed over to the Government of Nepal free of charge. Once that transfer happens, the company's primary source of revenue simply ceases to exist. What happens to the company after that, and what happens to the shares held by thousands of retail investors, remains entirely unclear under existing law.
The numbers involved make this silence deeply alarming. According to Securities Board of Nepal data, hydropower companies have received approval to issue ordinary shares worth a cumulative Rs. 50 billion 85 crore 75 lakh from fiscal year 2060/61 through Baisakh 2083. As of Baisakh 2082/83, the market capitalization of listed hydropower companies stands at Rs. 8 trillion 13 billion 99 crore — equivalent to 17.48 percent of total market capitalization. The sector accounts for 45.20 percent of total secondary market trading volume. These are not peripheral figures. Hydropower has become the backbone of Nepal's secondary market, which means any systemic shock to the sector would reverberate across the entire capital market.
At the heart of the problem lies a theoretical contradiction that has been overlooked for years. Ordinary equity shares, by their very nature, carry the characteristic of perpetuity — they represent permanent ownership in a company with no fixed end date. But hydropower company shares in Nepal are, in practice, time-limited instruments. They are only meaningful for as long as the project license remains valid. When the license expires and the project transfers to the government, the company loses its sole business. In developed and developing markets worldwide, BOT model companies do not issue ordinary equity shares — they raise capital through special purpose vehicles, project bonds, or infrastructure bonds specifically designed for time-limited assets. Nepal has applied the framework for a permanent equity instrument to what is effectively a temporary asset, and no one in authority has formally addressed this contradiction.
The High-Level Economic Reform Recommendation Commission 2081, formed under former Finance Minister Rameswhar Prasad Khanal, did not shy away from naming this problem. Its report explicitly identifies the fate of shares after the license period expires as a major unresolved challenge. It notes that some hydropower companies continue to trade at high share prices in the secondary market even when their net worth is negative — a situation that suggests widespread investor ignorance about the BOT model's direct implications for share value. The commission warned that if this situation is not addressed urgently, the resulting investor losses could prove more severe than the crisis that swept through savings and credit cooperatives. It recommended that special legal provisions be created specifically for BOT model companies listed on the stock exchange.
The problems extend well beyond the theoretical. Among companies that applied for rights share issuance as of 2082/12/18, more than 52 percent belonged to the hydropower sector. A consistent pattern has emerged in which companies raise money from the public through an initial public offering to repay bank loans, and then return to the market seeking rights share issuance approval for the same purpose all over again. This circular use of public capital raises serious questions about whether the primary market is being used as a debt refinancing mechanism rather than genuine capital formation. Multiple companies promoted by the same individual or group have been listed simultaneously, creating concentration risk and potential systemic vulnerabilities that no regulatory framework currently addresses. The growing practice of promoters resigning from boards to circumvent lock-in periods and sell shares freely adds yet another layer of governance concern.
The regulatory framework itself is fragmented and riddled with gaps. The Electricity Act 2049 sets a maximum license period of fifty years but says nothing about what happens to a listed company's equity structure after that period ends. The Hydropower Development Policy 2058 mandates project transfer to the government upon license expiry and guarantees against nationalization during the license period — but is silent on the post-transfer fate of public shareholders. The Electricity Regulatory Commission Act 2074, which established the sector regulator, does not specify what types of financial instruments hydropower companies may issue or what the Commission's role should be in overseeing capital market activities. The Securities Registration and Issuance Regulation 2073 requires companies to demonstrate going concern status before listing — but currently listed hydropower companies have made no disclosure about the risks to their going concern status after project transfer.
Experts and policymakers are now in broad agreement on what needs to happen. The Government of Nepal, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Finance, the Electricity Regulatory Commission, and the Securities Board of Nepal must come together to resolve a cluster of theoretical and legal questions that have been deferred for too long. These include determining what financial instrument is appropriate for BOT model companies — whether ordinary equity shares, project bonds, or infrastructure bonds — and making that determination explicit in law. A clear legal framework for what happens to listed hydropower companies after project transfer must be established, including how the company continues to operate, what its equity structure looks like, and what future cash flows investors can expect. Repeated public issuances for the same purpose must be regulated. Promoter share trading must be governed by stricter rules. And companies promoted by the same group must be subjected to consolidation requirements such as merger or acquisition to reduce systemic risk.
Nepal's capital market has grown significantly on the back of hydropower sector participation. But growth built on unresolved contradictions is not a foundation — it is a liability waiting to mature. Every year that these questions go unanswered is another year in which tens of thousands of retail investors pour their savings into instruments whose long-term legal status remains undefined. The High-Level Commission has already sounded the alarm. The regulatory bodies now have both the evidence and the mandate to act. What remains to be seen is whether they will move before the problem moves for them.
